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Degrees in the UK (2007 ± 2015) 
 
Dr Christopher Lalley1, 2, John Houston3 and Anne Gasteen4 
Abstract 
:HTXDQWLI\WKHUHWXUQVWRKLJKHUHGXFDWLRQIRUGHJUHHGLVFLSOLQHVQDPHO\µSURIHVVLRQDO¶
degrees, Medicine/Dentistry, Law, Accountancy and Psychology, within the UK from 2007 
to 2015.  We estimate the returns to education in the form of employment and wage premia 
associated with each subject.  Our analysis contributes to the existing literature on the topic of 
horizontal mismatch by estimating the wage premia in different occupational settings and 
identifying the penalty associated with horizontal mismatch in each field, and relative to all 
other graduates.  We identify how wage premia vary between employment outcomes when 
individuals with professional degrees are employed inside, as opposed to outside, their 
professional sector.  A distinct difference in mismatch penalties between male and female 
graduates was found.  Male mismatch penalties are isolated to law graduates, while female 
mismatch penalties appear, and persist within all fields across the duration of a female 
graduate¶V career.  
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Introduction 
A significant amount of research has been dedicated to estimate the value of higher education 
qualifications.  The value of education is expressed in both monetary returns (i.e. the wage 
premium of a specific qualification) and the extent to which obtaining a particular qualification 
affects DQLQGLYLGXDO¶VSUREDELOLW\RIJDLQLQJHPSOR\PHQW5HVHDUFK that focusses on monetary 
returns commonly applies a broad methodological approach that does not consider the value 
associated with specific degree subjects.  Recent research that has ventured into the analysis of 
specific degree returns is also inherently limited, in the sense that all forms of employment are 
treated equally, with no attempt to analyse how occupation may influence the returns associated 
with a given subject.  Some research in the field of horizontal mismatch has attempted to 
estimate the wage premia differences between subject/occupation mismatch, but such studies 
are limited both in their scope and by the degree of subjectivity applied in their methodological 
approach.  This paper extends the existing literature by estimating the returns associated with 
specific degree disciplines while also considering the value of specific degrees in different 
occupational settings.  The disciplines under examination are µSURIHVVLRQDO¶ degrees directly 
linked to specific vocations:  Law, Medicine, Dentistry, Psychology and Accountancy.  These 
degrees are normally regarded as the entry points to their associated professions, to be followed 
by formal training, assessment and experience gathering, then full qualification. At this point, 
the holders become fully-fledged professionals, and able to practise as such, should they choose 
to do so.  We account for LQGLYLGXDOV¶ employment outcomes, differentiating between 
µSURIHVVLRQDO¶and µJHQHUDO¶ occupations, where µSURIHVVLRQDO¶UHIHUVWRWKe situation where the 
holder of a professional degree chooses to work in the relevant professional sector5 and 
                                                 
5 An example of a professional working in the sector would be a law graduate working as a lawyer.  All law professions identified within the 
data set will be included within this category.  The same approach is applied with respect to each professional discipline.  
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µJHQHUDO¶ where they work outside that profession6.  The focus is on whether or not this choice 
accrues significantly higher premia to the holder. 
The paper is structured as follows:  firstly, there is a discussion of the literature on returns to 
education. We then present our methodology, including a full discussion of the data and the 
econometric methods used, then our findings.  This is followed by a discussion of these 
findings, their potential policy implications and concluding remarks. 
Previous Work 
The value associated with qualifications, expressed in terms of their ability to increase a 
JUDGXDWH¶VHarning potential, represents a significant area of interest in which a considerable 
amount of empirical research continues to be conducted.  In the context of this research area, 
WKH µYDOXH¶ DVVRFLDWHGZLWK DTXDOLILFDWLRQ LV H[SUHVVHG LQ WHUPVRI WKH H[WHnt to which the 
TXDOLILFDWLRQPDUJLQDOO\LQFUHDVHVWKHJUDGXDWH¶Vemployability and/or their wage, taking into 
account demographic variables such as age, gender and geographical location, etc.  DAVIES, 
et al. (2013) highlighted the importance prospective students attach to the potential wage 
premium associated with their degree, thereby amplifying the importance of expected wage 
returns in the course selection decision process.   
5HVHDUFK2¶/($5<DQG6/2$1(675$866DQGDE LA MAISONNEUVE (2009); 
KELLEY et al (2010); CHEVALIER (2011); CARNOY et al (2012); HALLSTEN (2012); and 
WALKER and ZHU (2011)) in multiple regions has sought to estimate wage returns associated 
with specific degree disciplines. and found, to varying degrees, positive returns associated with 
higher education within their labour markets.  LINDLEY and MCINTOSH (2015) also found 
that there is a growing wage inequality between graduates in different disciplines.  The 
approaches of these studies differ in so far as their analysis quantified the returns associated 
                                                 
6 An example of a professional working outside the sector would be a law graduate working in any profession other than law. 
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with specific degrees or fields of study, rather than a broad analysis of qualifications, 
irrespective of the field to which they apply.  Such research is a first step towards quantifying 
the value of specific degrees.  A caveat regarding these studies is that wage returns are 
calculated on the basis of general employment.  In applying this approach, they fail to take into 
account any wage differentials caused by different employment outcomes.  Even more recent 
studies, such as FREIER et al. (2015) who examine Law degrees, fail to account for the 
potential impact of employment setting on returns.   
Attempts to address the generalities of the prominent methods of returns to education 
literature exist in the form of the horizontal mismatch literature.  WOLBERS (2003) 
estimates mismatch penalties among school leavers using cross sectional data from 13 
European countries.  Wolbers finds that mismatched school leavers achieve a lower status 
within their occupation, are more likely to be dissatisfied with their job, and as such are more 
likely to engage in on the job search, while also being more likely to pursue vocational 
training opportunities.  Early contributions to this area of study focusing on degrees 
highlights the importance of attaining a match between occupation and field of study among 
university graduates.  ROBST (2007) uses a survey of US science graduates and estimates a 
mismatch penalty of an 11% difference in wages between matched and mismatched.  
Research which followed (NORDIN et al, 2010; BENDER and HEYWOOD, 2011) 
estimated the extent to which mismatch penalties differ by gender.  Using Swedish data, 
NORDIN et al (2010, op-cit) find that mismatch among males can lead to a 20% difference in 
wages, while mismatch among females leads to a 12% difference.  BENDER and 
HEYWOOD (2011, op-cit), find that severe mismatch among their sample of US science 
graduates leads to a 10.8% wage penalty for males and a 13.9% penalty for females.  ZHU 
(2014) estimates mismatch penalties for early career college graduates in China in part to 
observe if mismatch penalties differ in a developing country as the majority of earlier 
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UHVHDUFKKDVEHHQFRQGXFWHGLQGHYHORSHGFRXQWULHV=KX¶VILQGLQJVUHYHDODPRQthly 
horizontal mismatch penalty of only 1.3%, far smaller than that found in earlier horizontal 
mismatch studies.  VERHAEST et al (2017) uses data from Europe and Japan in an attempt 
to determine if differences in institutions and labour markets will yield different horizontal 
mismatch penalties.  The incidences of horizontal mismatch penalties alone are less prevalent 
in countries with stronger employment protection, greater unemployment benefits, and more 
selective educational programmes.  The above literature, in addition to other contributions 
(NORDIN et al, 2008; BENDER and ROCHE, 2013; DOMANDENIK et al, 2013; 
LEMIEUX, 2014) has sought to estimate the disparity in wage premia given a mismatch 
EHWZHHQDJUDGXDWH¶VVXEMHFWVWXGLHGDQGWKHLUHYHQWXDOoccupational.  The general findings 
DUHWKHSUHVHQFHRIDZDJHµSHQDOW\¶IRUWKRVHZKRH[SHULHQFHDPLVPDWFKEHWZHHQWKHLU
degree subject and their occupation.    While this literature has provided a significant 
contribution to our understanding of mismatch penalties, the existing literature suffers in two 
keys aspects.  Some of the studies referenced suffer from their small scale as in some cases 
the literature H[DPLQHVQRPRUHWKDQRQH\HDU¶VZRUWKRIGDWD6HFRQGO\WKHLU
methodological approach is at times rather imprecise and potentially subjective, identifying 
mismatch on a broad basis, focusing on degree subjects where the identification of either a 
match or mismatch is open to a wide degree of interpretation.  In some instances, the 
literature only focuses on mismatch within a specific sector, thereby potentially limiting the 
wider application of the findings. 
Methodology 
In terms of its scope, the analysis is limited necessarily to examining the returns to 
Medicine/Dentistry, Law, Accounting and Psychology graduates whose degrees are directly 
aligned with specific professions.  Other degree subjects are less clearly aligned with specific 
professions; e.g. it is not really possible to identify a single specific professional occupation for 
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an Economics, Engineering or Natural Science graduate, etc. in the same manner as for the 
above professional degrees.  In this sense, we overcome the perceived issue of subjectivity 
associated with existing mismatch literature where a less stringent approach is employed in 
identifying what constitutes a match/mismatch.  Our analysis of professional degrees is not 
exhaustive in that it does not account for all possible professional degrees.  Those that have 
been selected were chosen based in part on the availability of appropriate data.  Degree subjects 
were also selected based on the potential impact of the existence of a mismatch penalty.  For 
example, Law, Medicine, Dentistry and Accountancy represent courses, which carry a high 
entry tariff attracting some of the strongest applicants.  A severe and persistent mismatch 
penalty within these disciplines would represent a significant and potentially long-term cost for 
highly able individuals who may have otherwise pursued an alternative degree subject if they 
had been made aware of the potential for mismatch beforehand.  While entry to Psychology 
programmes in the UK requires a lower grade tariff, the subject still attracts a large number of 
applicants with Psychology and Sports Psychology appearing 4th and 8th respectively in The 
&RPSOHWH8QLYHUVLW\*XLGH¶VUDQNLQJRIPRVWSRSXODUFRXUVHVVWXGLHGLQWKH8.:LWK
such large numbers attending, and relatively few ending up in employment within the sector, a 
mismatch penalty could yield substantially different wage outcomes for a large number of 
graduates.   
The Probability of Employment in the Graduate Labour Market 
 
We assume WKDW JUDGXDWHV IRUP WZR JURXSV µ3URIHVVLRQDO¶ DQG µ*HQHUDO¶ Holders of 
professional degrees have opportunities for employment in both their particular specialist 
professional market as well as the general (graduate) labour market.  General graduates are 
only able to obtain work in the general (graduate) labour market; they cannot gain employment 
in the professional markets we examine as they do not have the appropriate prerequisite 
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degree7.  Wages may be institutionally-set in some professional graduate labour markets, for 
instance in Medicine and Dentistry.  Moreover, the demand for professional graduate entry-
level jobs is limited at any one time, and is assumed to be less than the supply of professional 
graduates as not all professional graduates who desire to work in the profession aligned with 
their degree, attain employment within their professional sector.  Any excess supply of 
professional graduates will have to look for work in the general graduate labour market together 
with a number of their professional graduate peers who have decided that their particular 
proIHVVLRQLVµQRWIRUWKHP¶.  There are of course other reasons beyond excess supply as to why 
a professional graduate would choose not to work within their professional sector.  Work-life 
balance, wages, proximity to home and family life represent a number of the possible reasons 
as to why one may opt to pursue a general occupation despite holding a professional degree.  
This paper cannot address this issue of mismatch based on choice as the data does not survey 
respondents on this point, and so approaches the topic from an over-supply perspective.  
Mismatch arising from choice is addressed in BENDER and ROCHE (2017), as they use a 
survey of US Science graduates which asks respondents who identify as mismatched for the 
reason they believe they are mismatched.  The issue of reasons for mismatch is also explored 
in ROBST (2007, op-cit) using an earlier version of the same data employed by BENDER and 
ROCHE (2017, op-cit),  
The probability that a Professional Graduate will be employed in graduate-level work (pp) is: 
 
> @10       , dd p
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p  
                                                 
7Of course, both groups could seek employment in the non-Graduate Market, though as we demonstrate later in the paper, the employment 
returns there are probably insufficiently attractive to them. 
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Where np is the number of professional graduates obtaining professional employment, npg is 
the number of professional graduates obtaining general employment and Np is the total number 
of professional graduates supplied. 
General graduates are, perforce, ineligible for entry into the Professional sector, and have to 
rely completely on the General sector.  Thus, the probability that a General Graduate will be 
employed (pg) is:
8 
݌௚ ൌ  ݊௚௚ܰ ൅  ௣ܰ ǡሾ ? ൑ ݌௚ ൑  ?ሿ 
Were ng is the number of general graduates obtaining employment, Ng is the total number of 
general graduates supplied and ௣ܰԢ is the total number of professional graduates, who are free 
to compete with general graduates having not attained employment in their professional sector. 
Given that the Professional Graduates have two opportunities to obtain graduate-level work, 
while their General counterparts have only one, we might expect that pp>pg especially if they 
KDYHµILUVWUHIXVDO¶RIJHQHUDOJUDGXDWH jobs.  7KHSUHPLVHRIµILUVWUHIXVDO¶RU,  more specifically, 
the potential preference for professional graduates over general graduates, is predicated on the 
fact that professional degrees have higher entry standards than general degrees, suggesting their 
holders to be  inherently more capable, talented individuals. We can express the probability 
that someone is employed in any given capacity Y (where Y = 1), given their observed 
characteristics (e.g. qualifications, age, location), using a standard Probit model:9 
ȡ(Y = 1 | X) = ߔ;¶ߚ) 
where ;¶ is a matrix of observed, independent variables and ȕ a vector of parameters to be 
estimated.  The variables of particular interest are the degree dummy variables, to estimate the 
impact on employment (as opposed to non-employment) of holding a specific qualification. 
                                                 
8 This general rate (pGLVORZHUHGE\WKHSUHVHQFHRIWKH3URIHVVLRQDOµUHIXJHHV¶GXHWRWKHUHGXFHGGHPDQGIRUprofessional graduates. 
9µ¶VLJQLILHVLQHPSOR\PHQWµ¶QRWLQHPSOR\PHQWLQWKLVFDVH 
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These record indiYLGXDOV¶TXDOLILFDWLRQ0HGLFDO$FFRXQWLQJ/DZ Psychology, with General 
degree as the excluded category).  Also included are Age (and Age2), Gender-degree and Public 
Sector-degree interactions and year dummy variables. 
Wage Rate Determination in the Graduate Labour Market 
 
Threshold entry qualifications to professional degree programmes in UK HE are higher than 
those for other subjects, this being particularly true of Medicine/Dentistry and Law.  Ceteris 
paribus, this would suggest that better school-qualified individuals enter these degree 
programmes, and this, in itself, is an indication of higher ability and productivity, and 
potentially higher future wages than general graduate.  This suggests that there will be three 
different graduate wage rates: 
(i) wp is the wage rate of a professional graduate employed in their respective 
profession 
(ii) wpg is the wage rate of a professional graduate employed in the general graduate 
labour market and 
(iii) wg is the wage rate of a general graduate  
It might therefore be expected that wp>wpg>wg. To test this empirically, this version of the 
human capital wage model developed by Mincer (1974) is estimated: 
  itiii XDw HOJUD  ''ln  
Where the (log) hourly wage rate (wi) is a function of: 
-combined degree and occupation dummies (Di) comprised of pairs of dummies for each 
respective profession (one each for in-profession and out-of-profession) and a dummy for 
general graduates (the latter again, being the excluded category) 
- other relevant observed variables (X¶i), Age and Age2 , tenure and location variables 
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- time-based dummies. 
7KHORJVSHFLILFDWLRQRIWKHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VKRXUO\UDWHRISD\DOORZVIRUߩ WR EH LQWHUSUHWHG DV WKH SHUFHQWDJH FKDQJH LQ DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V ZDJH rate based on their 
qualification and occupational VWDWXVDVGHILQHGE\ WKHPRGHO¶VGHJUee/employment dummy 
variables.  A separate model is estimated for males and females to capture the distinct 
differences in their employment outcomes and to determine the degree to which mismatch 
varies between genders.  Literature that has previously sought to estimate degree wage returns 
has done so relative to non-graduates, thereby highlighting the graduate wage premia.  Given 
the consistency of the finding that graduates command a wage premia relative to non-graduates, 
we investigate further, examining premia variation between graduates of different subjects, i.e. 
professional graduates relative to all other graduates.  Individuals without an undergraduate 
degree are dropped from the sample.  This decision to drop non-graduates yields an arguably 
more homogenous sample of individuals.  Their comparable level of education infers a greater 
likelihood of comparable consistencies in their demographic and background characteristics.  
In the analysis, this potentially diminishes differences in wages driven by unobserved factors.  
Data 
7KH 8.¶V 4XDUWHUO\ Labour Force Survey (QLFS) data for the period January 2007 to 
December 2015 are used.  Individuals between 25 and 60 years of age are included.  The 
number of observations for each model varies, given that separate models are estimated for 
males and females, and given the inherent variation in sample sizes based on the nature of 
dependent variable.  Employment models commonly consist of more observations than wage 
models as respondents are generally less inclined to report their salary with surveys such as the 
LFS.  The wage model consists only of full-time observations in an attempt to control for the 
inherent differences in working patterns between men and women.  By removing part-time 
employees, we can reasonably exclude the assumption that mismatch penalties may be a 
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function of the greater propensity for women to work part-time.  Self±employed observations 
are not included within the wage model, as self-employed individuals do not report a wage 
within the LFS.  As such, they cannot be included, leading to a potential downward bias on 
wage estimates in older observations.  It is the case that older professional graduates whom are 
more likely to be self-employed in the later stages of their career having established a reputation 
and contacts within their field.  A breakdown of the rate of self-employment rates (ONS, 2018) 
across the professional degree disciplines is summarised in Table 110.  The rate of self-
employment across disciplines is relatively consistent and in each case is representative of only 
a minority of the population, with the vast majority being not self-employed11. 
Table  1   
Professional Graduate Rate of Self-Employment 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
2007 - 2015 
Average 
Law 30% 31% 28% 31% 27% 27% 26% 28% 30% 29% 
Medicine/Dentistry 24% 19% 22% 20% 19% 20% 21% 22% 21% 21% 
Psychology - - - - - - 13% - 14% 14% 
Accountancy 21% 15% 17% 16% 11% 16% 13% 11% 16% 15% 
- Indicates where there was an insufficient sample for a reliable estimate to be made 
 
With regards to the estimation of match and mismatch penalties, observations holding one of 
the four aforementioned professional degrees are defined as matched or mismatched using 
four-digit SOC (Standard Occupational Classification) codes.  An observation is matched if 
their occupation code perfectly aligns with their degree, in that without this degree one cannot 
take part in this occupation. Observations are mismatched for any other occupational code that 
does not align with their degree12,13.  This does not exclude the notion that there may be 
similarities between the nature of skills a degree involves and a mismatched occupation.  For 
                                                 
10 Table A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix summarises rates of self-employment across professional degree disciplines by gender 
11 Where no data is provided the ONS state a reliable estimate of self-employment within the discipline could not be made 
12 Tables B.1 and B.2  in the Appendix provides a full summary of mismatched and mismatched SOC codes across the four professional 
degree disciplines, broken down by gender 
13 Tables C.1 to C.8 summarises the percentage of graduates working within out of profession occupations summarised by degree 
discipline, age and gender 
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example, the numeracy skills developed by an accountancy degree may crossover to what we 
have defined as the mismatched occupation of Financial and Investment analyst.  The crossover 
in skills does not suffice to define this combination as matched, as it is not necessary to study 
accountancy to become a Financial or Investment analyst, compared to the necessary study of 
accountancy to become an accountant.  An equivalent sentiment applies to the notion of match 
and mismatch across all other degree disciplines.     
In an attempt to control for ability bias the sample consists only of those who have attained 2 
or more A-levels, or for Scottish students, 3 or more SQA Highers.  This excludes those who 
have failed to attain an µacceptable¶ standard of attainment at secondary school but who 
somehow may have attended university.  A further attempt to control for ability bias is made 
by dropping observations that attained a degree classification of less than a 2.1.  This ensures 
that we are left with a relatively homogenous sample whereby the individuals included have 
achieved comparable results in their respective fields; thereby as much as possible, reducing 
concerns that some form of ability bias may adversely affect the results.  The decision to limit 
the sample to graduates with a 2.1 or better yields a comparative group of higher calibre 
graduates.  There is a tendency in the interpretation of mismatch estimation results to believe 
that those subject to a mismatch penalty are actually simply weaker graduates being paid less 
relative to their stronger counterparts.  Given that we focus only on those who attain the highest 
classification levels addresses the concern that any wage disparity is a consequence of poor 
graduate quality, rather than a genuine mismatch penalty.  The approach we have applied to 
correcting for ability bias was popularised by CARD (1999) and is used consistently in returns 
to education literature.  The notion that it is indeed a mismatch penalty and not a consequence 
of poor graduate quality is clearer when one observes the data in our sample detailing the 
distribution of graduates employed within and outside the professional sector based on the 
classification they obtained.  If the allocation of employees within the professional jobs 
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favoured perceived higher quality candidates then one might observe the majority of these jobs 
being dominated by graduates with a 1st class classification, with jobs outside the professional 
sector dominated by graduates with lower classifications.  As tables D.1 to D.4 in the Appendix 
illustrates this is not the case.  While there is a greater presence of 1st class graduates in 
professional occupations they are in the minority with few exceptions to this case, such as those 
observed among medics and dentists working in their professional field. 
In limiting the sample based on degree classification, we must consider any potential 
implications associated with grade, or in this case, degree classification inflation over time.  
Grade inflation refers to the premise that over time there has been a progressive increase in the 
proportion of graduates attaining higher degree classifications thereby diminishing the value 
of attaining such higher classifications over time (JOHNES AND JOHNES, 2007).  There may 
also be an inherent concern that despite the explained logic behind removing those with less 
than a 2.1 classification, that in the process, we may be excluding those who attained a 2.2 
classification in older cohorts, which due to grade inflation over time, holds equivalent value 
as a 2.1 classification today.  While possible, this should not be of concern given the 
comparisons between graduates that this paper aims to evaluate.  The underlying premise of 
the analysis is not to compare the earnings or employability of younger versus older graduates, 
but rather to purely compare the earnings and employability of graduates,  of the same 
discipline, within the same age bracket, relative to all other graduates of the same age.  In this 
sense, even in the presence of some degree of grade inflation, it is applicable to all graduates 
to the same general extent within their given age group.  Furthermore, upon reviewing the 
distribution of the classifications of the graduates within our data set, as presented in Figure 1 
we find that while 2.2 and 3rd class degrees are less prevalent through time, the modal 
classification category across all cohorts remains consistent at a 2.1 classification.  One minor 
point to consider when analysing Figure 1 is concerning the interpretation of medicine and 
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dentistry graduates.  In the case of medics, their degrees are not classified in the traditional 1st, 
2.1, etc framework, but rather as a pass at either a merit or distinction level.  This explains why 
the largest portion of medics report their degree as a pass, which in the case of the other degree 
reported refers to the lowest classification one can attain.  The medics who report their degree 
class as 1st or 2.1 have likely self-selected into this category based on their own interpretation 
of where their pass falls in to the standard degree classification framework.  Given the nature 
of this data anomaly, a decision was made to include Medics and Dentists declaring their degree 
as a pass within the data as such individuals will in all likelihood constitute valid observations 
given the restrictions outlined earlier. 
Figure 1 Degree Classification by Graduation Cohort 
 
Additional approaches to correcting for ability bias exist, but unfortunately, we are 
restricted by the data in this instance, as no such information exists in the LFS, therefore 
attempts to correct for ability bias are limited to those employed.  The concerns regarding 
controlling for ability bias while using the LFS were more recently highlighted by MCINTOSH 
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and MORRIS (2016).  McIntosh and Morris highlight the difficulty in controlling for 
endogeneity while using the LFS, insisting that in the absence of appropriate measures, the 
most suitable approach is to make control and treatment groups as similar as possible to allow 
for a plausible analysis to be processed.  McIntosh and Morris reference several publish studies 
using the LFS which have applied this perspective in their analysis (DEARDEN ET AL, 2002; 
DEARDEN ET AL, 2004; DICKERSON and VIGNOLES, 2007; JENKINS ET AL, 2007).  
Relating specifically to horizontal mismatch, ZHU (2014, op-cit) endorses a similar approach 
of diminishing the potential effects of ability bias by conducting estimates using as 
homogenous a sample as possible.  Zhu goes on to discuss how the estimation of horizontal 
mismatch penalties generally does not lend itself well to methods used to correct for ability 
bias and that no method exists that allows for consistent and accurate control of potential ability 
bias. 
It is useful to have some idea of the level of apparent retention within each profession, that is, 
the percentage of graduates with degrees in Medicine/Dentistry, Accounting, Law and 
Psychology who actually work in their associated profession.  Table 2 indicates the 
percentages that do so, by Age Group14. 
  
                                                 
14 Age brackets define the assumed early (25 to 35)  middle (36 to 45) and late (46 to 60)stages of an observation¶s career  
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Table 2 
% of Professional Graduates working in and outside their respective Profession 
Profession 
Male 
N 
Female 
N 
Age 
Group 
Male In 
Profession 
Female In 
Profession 
Male Out of 
Profession 
Female Out of 
Profession 
Medicine & 
Dentistry 
199 298 All 83% 85% 17% 15% 
60 148 25 to 35 93% 88% 7% 12% 
69 83 36 to 45 84% 87% 16% 13% 
70 67 46 to 60 74% 75% 26% 25% 
Accountancy 
190 156 All 35% 37% 65% 63% 
92 86 25 to 35 43% 41% 57% 59% 
60 52 36 to 45 32% 33% 68% 67% 
38 18 46 to 60 26% 28% 74% 72% 
Law 
282 451 All 46% 45% 54% 55% 
136 253 25 to 35 50% 46% 50% 54% 
71 134 36 to 45 55% 42% 45% 58% 
75 64 46 to 60 31% 47% 69% 53% 
Psychology 
125 435 All 15% 20% 85% 80% 
48 233 25 to 35 2% 21% 98% 79% 
44 115 36 to 45 25% 19% 75% 81% 
33 87 46 to 60 21% 22% 79% 78% 
Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of Medical/Dental graduates of all ages are observed working 
in their respective professions.  It is within professions such as medicine and dentistry that the 
exclusion of graduates aged under 25 seems most appropriate as it is unlikely that many would 
be classed as in-profession at this age given the time it takes to be suitably qualified to practice 
as a doctor or dentist.  Entering into the mid-career age bracket, we observe a consistent decline 
in the number of individuals working within the profession for males, while the comparable 
numbers for females stays relatively consistent until the late career stage.  This may occur for 
a variety of reasons.  We observe within the data an increase in the number of male individuals 
with medical degrees working in medical management professions i.e. individuals who likely 
worked as practitioners in the past migrating to management roles later in their careers.  
Individuals may be retiring early given the high income they have attained throughout their 
career or, potentially, may become self-employed via establishment of their own private 
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practices.  Comparing the In and Out of profession figures for medicine and dentistry relative 
to all other disciplines, one  might conclude that the intake into Medical Schools is more closely 
matched to the market demand, than for other professions as a vastly greater proportion of 
medics and dentists end up employed within their profession compared with the other 
professionals*LYHQWKDWWKH8.¶V1DWLRQDO+HDOWK6HUYLFH1+6LVDYLUWXDOPRQRSVRQLVW 
that ZRUNVFORVHO\ZLWKWKH+(IXQGLQJDJHQFLHVDQG8QLYHUVLWLHV¶0HGLFDO6FKRROVDQGWKH
high level of pre-entry screening, the length and arduousness of the training, the high level of 
reward (both pecuniary and non-pecuniary), this relatively close match is to be expected. 
Contrast this with Psychology graduates, of whom only 2% of males and 21% of 
females work in the profession between  the ages of 25 and 35.  This dispersion of psychology 
graduates in and out of the profession is relatively consistent as approximately a fifth of 
graduates within any age group work within the profession, presumably acquiring experience 
and qualifications in the early stages of their career and then eventually working as qualified 
and licensed practitioners in the later age groups.  The remaining 80% are consistently 
employed in general professions.  This clearly reflects the generalist appeal of such degrees 
and the multiplicity of career paths that those graduates wish to pursue.  Anecdotally, many go 
into general business and management, particularly into areas such as marketing and human 
resource management. 
Between Medicine/Dentistry and Psychology, lie Law and Accounting, where a 
medium to large minority (35 ± 46%) can be seen working in both professions.  Similar to 
Psychology perhaps, the employer demand for such graduates is relatively diffused and funding 
agencies are content to finance University places with only a vague eye on underlying employer 
demand.  That said, both professions have Statutory Professional Bodies (Law Society, Bar 
Council, Chartered Accountancy Institutes, etc), who set high standards for their various levels 
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of professional membership15.  It might be concluded that the effect of these Bodies is to limit 
the numbers entering those professions, with a consequent displacement into the general 
graduate market.  There will also be those who never intended gaining full professional 
accreditation, but valued the degree for its inherent challenge and general employability 
potential.  We can also detect some drifting out of the Law and Accounting professionals in 
the late career stage.  The gender disparity in this outcome is most pronounced among late 
career law graduates as 29% of male graduates remain in the sector compared to 47% of 
females.  As with medics and dentists, the fall in graduates operating within the sector may 
reflect the migration of more experienced lawyers from employee to self-employed status.  
What is not evident within the table is anecdotal evidence that there is currently a UK-wide 
shortage of Legal Apprenticeships (ALDRIDGE, 2011; 2012).  This lack of apprenticeships 
might be apparent if the sample included individuals aged under 25, thereby capturing law 
graduates in the early stages of their career when their employment is dependent upon holding 
an apprenticeship.  A general decline in the presence of accountants within that sector is less 
drastic and is not characterised by a gender disparity comparable to that of law.  The 
explanation for the decline may again be a function of increased self-employment rates. 
Employment Premia to Professional Degrees 
The average employment premia associated with possession of a degree in each professional 
discipline across both genders are plotted in Figures 2 and 3 with two-standard error bands 
indicated (General Graduates are the excluded category)16.  Upon review of the male 
employment model we find that, with the exception of Medics and an inconsistent effect for 
Accountants, there appears to be no employment premia associated with holding a professional 
degree rather than a general degree.  This finding is partially mirrored in the female version of 
                                                 
15 While the data set does not provide information on professional body membership, it is safe to assume that all graduates working within 
such professions will be a member of their respective professional body as this is a requirement to practice as a lawyer or psychologist 
16The full results are shown in Tables E.1 and E.2 in the Appendix. 
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the employment model.   Female medics attain a consistent employment premia throughout the 
duration of their careers, with the effect being most pronounced in their mid-career age bracket.  
This may be a function of female medics taking fewer and shorter family career breaks relative 
to other graduates.  No other profession exhibits a consistent pattern such as that observed with 
female medics and dentists.   
Wage Rate Premia to Professional Degrees 
 
We now consider the extent to which a gUDGXDWH¶VZDJHUDWHLHLPSOLHGKRXUO\ZDJHLV
affected by possession of a degree in a particular discipline.  Someone with a professional 
degree may not wish (or be otherwise permitted) to follow a career in the associated 
profession.  We consider graduates from the four professional disciplines located either in the 
Professional or General sectors and whether there is evidence that the employment location 
choice has a significant impact on their wage rate.  Figures 4 and 5 summarise the average 
(log) wage rate premia accruing to the professional degrees inside and outside their 
associated professions for males and females respectively when compared with general 
graduates.17,18 
  
                                                 
17The full results are shown in Table F.1 and F.2 in the Appendix. 
18 Separate estimates have been conducted using a median regression and are presented in Table G.1 and G.2 in the Appendix. 
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Figure 2 Female Employment Premia: Professional Degrees 
 
Figure 3 Male Employment Premia: Professional Degrees 
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Figure 4 Female Wage Rate Premia: Professional Graduates Working In/Out of their Professional Sector 
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Figure 5 Male Wage Rate Premia: Professional Graduates Working In/Out of their Professional Sector 
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Male Wage Rate Premia to Professional Degrees ± Relative to All Other Graduates 
The findings of the male wage model reveal consistently high wage premiums for graduates 
of medicine/dentistry or law who have managed to gain employment within their professional 
sector.  The premia for medics and dentists is consistently significantly greater than that 
attained by all other graduates and rises throughout DPDOHLQGLYLGXDO¶VZRUNLQJOLIH$
similar pattern is observed amongst law graduates who work as practicing lawyers, though 
their wages do not reach the peak obtained by medics or dentists.  The experiences of male 
accountancy graduates working within the sector are less consistent.  Accountants outperform 
the all other graduates category in the early stages of their career, but this difference is erased 
in the mid and late stages of their career.  This may not be driven by a diminishing value of 
accountancy graduates working in the profession but rather may reflect all other graduates 
µFDWFKLQJXS¶DVWKH\EHFRPe more established in their careers, progressively eroding the 
wage premia advantage that young accountants held over hem earlier in their career.  The 
experiences of male psychologists working within their professional sector are less 
optimistic.  Across early and mid-age groups, their graduate wage premia is equivalent to that 
experienced by all other graduates.  They only attain a statistically significant premium in the 
late stage of their careers   
In general, the wage premia experienced by male professional graduates who attain 
work outside their sector is not significantly different from that accruing to all other 
graduates.  Only mid and late stage career medicine and dentistry graduates achieve 
consecutive periods of statistically significant higher returns relative to all other graduates.  
While early career accountants and psychologists respectively experience a significantly 
higher wage premia than general graduates, there is no consistent pattern over their working 
lives. 
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Female Wage Rate Premia to Professional Degrees ± Relative to All Other Graduates 
Similar to their male counterparts, female graduates of medicine and dentistry working within 
the profession consistently outperform all other graduates.  Their wage premia is high and 
rises throughout the duration of their careers.  Female law graduates working in law 
experience consistently higher premia than all other graduates, mirroring that of their male 
law graduates counterparts.  Female psychologists working in psychology consistently 
experience returns above those of all other graduates.  Similar to medics and dentists, female 
psychologists see their earnings rise throughout their career.  Female accountants working in 
accountancy achieve a higher wage premia than all other graduates in their early and mid-
career phases.  Similar to male accountants, their premia become insignificantly different 
from general graduates during the late career stage between the ages of 46 to 60.  Again, this 
may reflect the possibility that all other graduates have gradually caught up with the 
professional accountants in their career development, and in the process have narrowed the 
wage gap between the two groups, rather than an absolute decline in returns to older female 
accountants. 
For female professional graduates working outside of their professional sector, we universally 
observe that, regardless of subject or career stage, they obtain a wage rate that is equivalent to 
that of all other graduates. 
Horizontal Mismatch Penalties 
The existence and extent of any horizontal mismatch penalties between graduates of the same 
subject, based on their eventual occupation are now examined.  Having estimated the 
respective wage models for males and females, we can take the coefficients for a graduate 
within and out with their professional sector and calculate linear combinations using STATA.  
The linear combinations reveal whether the difference between the two coefficients is 
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statistically significant, and, thereby, indicate the presence and extent to which a horizontal 
mismatch penalty exists between graduates of the same discipline working in different 
occupational sectors.   
The linear combinations results are summarised in Tables 3 and 4 reveals a stark 
contrast between the mismatch penalties experienced by females and males.  The coefficients 
presented are the differences in the coefficients between specific groups of graduates as 
estimated in the main wage estimates.  These differences are the percentage differences 
between the wages of the two groups under examination. The female linear combinations 
indicate that, with the exception of late career accountants, there is a statistically significant 
difference between the wages of a graduate with a professional degree who is employed 
within the associated profession, compared to a graduate with the same degree who has 
gained employment within any other sector.  The implication is that significant, career length 
mismatch penalties exist for the majority of female professional degree graduates working 
outside their professional sector. 
Conversely, in general, for male professional degree graduates, the disparity between 
the wage rate of those inside and outside of their respective sector is consistently insignificant.  
This suggests that for men, there is no discernible premia experienced by professional degree 
graduates who attain employment directly related to their field of study comparted to those 
who attained the same degree and work in an unrelated field.  The one minor exception is Law 
graduates.   Male law graduates who work within a law occupation attain a statistically 
significant wage premia relative to their fellow law graduates who work outside the profession 
in their early career stage.  This penalty is only marginally significant in the mid-career phase, 
and is insignificant by the time male graduates reach the final phase of their career. 
 
Table 3 Female Wage Model ± Linear Combinations (By Age Group) 
Age 25-35 
26 
 
Subject Coefficient S.E. t P>|t| 
Medic/Dentist in Medic/Dentist Job - Medic/Dentist in Other 
Job 0.304 0.088 3.46 0.001 
Law in Law Job - Law in Other Job 0.276 0.044 6.24 0.000 
Accountancy in Accountancy Job - Accountancy in Other Job 0.243 0.076 3.17 0.002 
Psychology in Psychology Job - Psychology in Other Job 0.104 0.056 1.84 0.065 
Age 36-45 
Medic/Dentist in Medic/Dentist Job - Medic/Dentist in Other 
Job 0.557 0.140 3.98 0.000 
Law in Law Job - Law in Other Job 0.289 0.075 3.81 0.000 
Accountancy in Accountancy Job - Accountancy in Other Job 0.197 0.128 1.54 0.124 
Psychology in Psychology Job - Psychology in Other Job 0.272 0.102 2.65 0.008 
Age 46-60 
Medic/Dentist in Medic/Dentist Job - Medic/Dentist in Other 
Job 0.601 0.128 4.68 0.000 
Law in Law Job - Law in Other Job 0.364 0.114 3.18 0.001 
Accountancy in Accountancy Job - Accountancy in Other Job 0.115 0.240 0.48 0.630 
Psychology in Psychology Job - Psychology in Other Job 0.430 0.121 3.35 0.000 
 
  
Table 4 Male Wage Model - Linear Combinations (By Age Group) 
Age 25-35 
Subject Coefficient S.E. t P>|t| 
Medic/Dentist in Medic/Dentist Job - Medic/Dentist in Other 
Job 0.023 0.200 0.12 0.907 
Law in Law Job - Law in Other Job 0.206 0.066 3.12 0.002 
Accountancy in Accountancy Job - Accountancy in Other Job -0.080 0.081 -0.99 0.325 
Psychology in Psychology Job - Psychology in Other Job 0.158 0.390 0.41 0.685 
Age 36-45 
Medic/Dentist in Medic/Dentist Job - Medic/Dentist in Other 
Job 0.020 0.147 0.14 0.891 
Law in Law Job - Law in Other Job 0.239 0.106 2.24 0.025 
Accountancy in Accountancy Job - Accountancy in Other Job 0.128 0.124 1.03 0.304 
Psychology in Psychology Job - Psychology in Other Job -0.249 0.156 -1.60 0.110 
Age 46-60 
Medic/Dentist in Medic/Dentist Job - Medic/Dentist in Other 
Job 0.150 0.129 1.17 0.242 
Law in Law Job - Law in Other Job 0.199 0.120 1.65 0.099 
Accountancy in Accountancy Job - Accountancy in Other Job -0.102 0.177 -0.58 0.565 
Psychology in Psychology Job - Psychology in Other Job 0.488 0.205 2.38 0.017 
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Conclusions 
The employment and earnings¶ returns to the four Professional degree subjects - 
Medicine/Dentistry, Law, Accounting and Psychology - that permit entry into associated 
professional occupations were estimated and compared with those accruing to General 
graduates.  We have added to the analytical approach commonly found in the literature, by 
considering earnings returns to degrees as a function of not just the subject an individual 
studied, but also their employment outcome and in the process identified the horizontal 
mismatch penalty associated with failing to attain an appropriate education and occupation 
match.  Our findings identify differences in employment premia among Professional degree 
KROGHUVDQGVKRZKRZWKHLUHDUQLQJV¶SUHPLDYDU\DFFRUGLQJWRZKHWKHURr not they choose to 
pursue a career in their associated professional field or in the wider General graduate labour 
market.  Horizontal mismatch penalties are not equally experienced by male and female 
graduates.  There is a clear gender disparity to the extent that the female sample is characterised 
by persistent mismatch penalties across all disciplines and almost all age brackets.  For male 
graduates, mismatch penalties only appear among law graduates. 
Despite pre-conceived notions of an intrinsic value attached to professional degrees, our 
findings indicate that with respect to employability, a professional degree does not consistently 
yield a greater likelihood of employment compared to a general degree, except in medicine and 
dentistry, where both male female graduates experience an employment premium relative to 
all other graduates.  Beyond this, there are no consistent patterns of significant employment 
premia associated with professional degrees across both genders and age groups.  
The existence of horizontal mismatch penalties is observed consistently amongst female 
professional degree graduates working outside their associated profession.  With the temporal 
exception of Law, the absence of mismatch penalties among male professional graduates 
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indicates that men are generally not penalised in the labour market for failing to attain 
employment in their associated professional sector.  Thus, for men, failure to attain 
employment within the professional sector does not appear to convey a negative signal to the 
labour market that employers might respond to by offering a lower wage.  However, the same 
is not true in the female professional graduate market.  Here, there is a statistically significant 
difference between the wages of female professional graduates working within their associated 
sectors compared to those who work outside, with the former receiving a higher wage.  This 
suggests that when a female professional degree graduate fails to attain employment within the 
associated sector, a negative signal is sent to the labour market, resulting in a lower wage rate.  
The factors driving this disparity in the presence of mismatch penalties seem unclear at this 
time.  A potential explanation may lie in other mismatch literature (ROBST, 2007 op-cit; 
BENDER and ROCHE, 2017 op-cit) whereby the data used includes variables indicating an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VEHOLHIfor the primary reason why they feel they are mismatched.  One of the most 
VLJQLILFDQWIDFWRUVLQH[SODLQLQJWKLVEHOLHIRIPLVPDWFKDPRQJIHPDOHV¶centres around family 
reasons, where the female may seek out mismatched employment to pursue a more even 
balance between work and family life.  It is a conscious decision such as this, which may lead 
fewer women to pursue more demanding professional jobs and as a result settle for job that is 
more personally suitable, but which ultimately yields a mismatch penalty.    Beyond this point, 
generally addressing the topic of the gender mismatch disparity we have identified requires 
further research to test the consistency of this finding across other professional degrees, and 
over time with a larger sample of professional graduates 
The commonly held perception that professional degrees PDNH IRU µJRRG¶ JHQHUDO GHJUHHV
endowing their holders with relatively more favourable employment and earnings returns in 
the General graduate labour market is open to question given our findings.  Whilst this appears 
to be the case for males, the same effect is not present for females.  From an employment 
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perspective, only medicine and dentistry appear to yield the assumed employment premium 
that prospective students anticipated when selecting their degree.  Given the investment that 
students make in undertaking their degrees, it would not be unreasonable to assume that they 
pursue such in order to attain a profession with stable employment prospects that is both 
financially rewarding and intellectually stimulating.  Indeed, this is often reflected in the 
attitude of students when interviewed.  In order to make optimal degree choices, students need 
to be better-informed about the realities of the labour market they intend entering.  Whilst 
universities cannot be expected to provide a complete analysis of the employment and wage 
prospects associated with their courses (in part due to a lack of available information), there is 
an inherent incentive to continue to promote µvalue myths¶ in order to continue to attract 
students and subsequently funding, via fees and/or state support.  It is therefore incumbent upon 
various other stakeholders, primarily governments via academic research, to improve the 
dissemination of information to prospective students and the sources they rely upon, be it 
academic advisors, industry professionals or their family.  Not to do so, may be detrimental to 
labour market efficiency as highly able, qualified candidates become funnelled into fields over-
supplied with graduates.  As a result, they then have to seek employment outside the profession 
associated with their degree, only to find, that their probability of employment is no greater or 
worse than that of other graduates, (who, arguably, may have studied far less rigorously 
demanding subjects).  Furthermore, the higher wage premia value of their degree relative to 
other graduates is only truly experienced by those fortunate enough to gain employment within 
the associated profession.  
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APPENDIX: Supplementary Tables and Detailed Regression Results 
Table A.1 
Female Professional Graduate Rate of Self-Employment 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
2007 - 2015 
Average 
Law 18% 14% 16% 15% 17% 16% 15% 13% 12% 15% 
Medicine/Dentistry 11% 10% 10% - - 13% 14% 7% 13% 11% 
Psychology - - - - - - - - - - 
Accountancy - - - - - - - 6% 9% 7% 
 
Table A.2 
Male Professional Graduate Rate of Self-Employment 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
2007 - 2015 
Average 
Law 41% 45% 37% 45% 35% 38% 35% 40% 43% 40% 
Medicine/Dentistry 31% 25% 26% 27% 23% 28% 27% 31% 27% 27% 
Psychology - - - - - - - - - - 
Accountancy 23% 16% 15% 16% 15% 22% 19% 15% 20% 18% 
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Table B.1 
Female Out of Occupation Classification and Codes 
Degree Subject 
SOC Codes and Categories 
In Profession Out of Profession* 
Medicine/Dentistry 
2211, 2215 1181, 2112, 2218 
Medical Practitioner, and 
Dental Practitioner 
Hospital and Health Service 
Managers, Biological Scientist, 
Podiatrist 
Law 
2411, 2412, 2413, 2419 2311, 2443, 3562 
Occupational codes cover 
Judges, Lawyers, 
Barristers, Solicitors, 
Advocates, Officers of the 
Court and any other 
category of Legal 
Professional 
Higher Education Teaching 
Professionals, Probation Officer, 
Personnel and Industrial 
Relations Officer 
Psychology 
2212 2315, 2316, 3545 
Psychologists 
Primary and Nursery Education 
Teaching Professionals, Special 
Needs Education Teaching 
Professional, and Community 
Marketing Management 
Accountancy 
2421, 2422 1131, 3534, 4122 
Chartered and Certified 
Accountants, and 
Management Accountants 
Financial Managers and 
Chartered Secretaries, Finance 
and Investment Analyst/Advisor, 
and Financial Clerks 
*Out of profession codes and categories limited to codes/categories accounting for 
10% or more of the sample, and/or the top 3 occupational codes/categories 
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Table B.2 
Male Out of Occupation Classification and Codes 
Degree Subject 
SOC Codes and Categories 
In Profession Out of Profession* 
Medicine/Dentistry 
2211, 2215 1171, 1181, 2311 
Medical Practitioner, and 
Dental Practitioner 
Officers in Armed Forces, 
Hospital and Health Service 
Managers, and Higher 
Education Teaching 
Professionals 
Law 
2411, 2412, 2413, 2419 1131, 1132, 2311 
Occupational codes cover 
Judges, Lawyers, Barristers, 
Solicitors, Advocates, 
Officers of the Court and any 
other category of Legal 
Professional 
Financial Managers and 
Chartered Secretaries, 
Marketing and Sales Managers 
and Higher Education 
Teaching Professionals  
Psychology 
2212 2311, 2315 , 3543 
Psychologists 
Higher Education Teaching 
Professionals, Primary and 
Nursery Education Teaching 
Professionals, and Marketing 
Associate Professionals 
Accountancy 
2421, 2422 1131, 3534, 4122 
Chartered and Certified 
Accountants, and 
Management Accountants 
Financial Managers and 
Chartered Secretaries, Finance 
and Investment 
Analyst/Advisor, and Financial 
Clerks 
*Out of profession codes and categories limited to codes/categories accounting for 
10% or more of the sample, and/or the top 3 occupational codes/categories 
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Table C.1 
Female Law Graduates Out of Profession Occupation Summary 
Occupations 
Age 
All 25-35 36-45 46-60 
Higher Education Professional 4% 0% 6% 9% 
Probation Officer 5% 0% 4% 3% 
Personnel and Industrial Relations Officer 3% 0% 1% 0% 
Other 88% 100% 89% 88% 
 
Table C.2 
Female Medicine/Dentistry Graduates Out of Profession Occupation Summary 
Occupations 
Age 
All 25-35 36-45 46-60 
Hospital and Health Service Managers 4% 6% 0% 6% 
Biological Scientist 7% 6% 0% 12% 
Podiatrist 9% 6% 18% 6% 
Other 80% 82% 82% 66% 
 
Table C.3 
Female Psychology Graduates Out of Profession Occupation Summary 
Occupations 
Age 
All 25-35 36-45 46-60 
Primary and Nursery Education 7% 6% 10% 3% 
Special Needs Education 5% 3% 2% 13% 
Community Marketing Management 3% 4% 3% 1% 
Other 85% 87% 85% 83% 
 
Table C.4 
Female Accountancy Graduates Out of Profession Occupation Summary 
Occupations 
Age 
All 25-35 36-45 46-60 
Financial Manager and Chartered Secretary 12% 6% 26% 0% 
Finance and Investment Analyst/Advisor 4% 4% 6% 0% 
Financial Clerks 19% 27% 9% 15% 
Other 65% 63% 59% 85% 
 
Table C.5 
Male Law Graduates Out of Profession Occupation Summary 
Occupations 
Age 
All 25-35 36-45 46-60 
Financial Manager and Chartered Secretary 7% 4% 13% 8% 
Higher Education Professional 7% 6% 6% 6% 
Marketing and Sales managers 5% 4% 3% 12% 
Other 80% 86% 78% 74% 
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Table C.6 
Male Medicine/Dentistry Graduates Out of Profession Occupation Summary 
Occupations 
Age 
All 25-35 36-45 46-60 
Officers in Armed Forces 15% 0% 9% 22% 
Hospital and Health Service Managers 12% 0% 9% 17% 
Higher Education Professional 15% 0% 9% 22% 
Other 58% 100% 73% 39% 
 
Table C.7 
Male Psychology Graduates Out of Profession Occupation Summary 
Occupations 
Age 
All 25-35 36-45 46-60 
Higher Education Professional 6% 0% 6% 12% 
Primary and Nursery Education 5% 11% 0% 0% 
Marketing Associate Professionals 6% 7% 6% 4% 
Other 84% 92% 88% 84% 
 
Table C.8 
Male Accountancy Graduates Out of Profession Occupation Summary 
Occupations 
Age 
All 25-35 36-45 46-60 
Financial Manager and Chartered Secretary 40% 23% 44% 64% 
Finance and Investment Analyst/Advisor 7% 15% 2% 0% 
Financial Clerks 7% 12% 5% 0% 
Other 46% 50% 49% 36% 
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Table D.1 
Professional Graduate in Professional Employment - Summary of Degree Subject by 
Age and Degree Classification (Female Sample) 
 
Law Medicine/Dentistry Accountancy Psychology 
1st 2.1 1st 2.1 1st 2.1 1st 2.1 
25 to 35 13% 87% 50% 50% 37% 63% 21% 79% 
36 to 45 9% 91% 32% 68% 41% 59% 9% 91% 
46 to 60 10% 90% 40% 60% 20% 80% 6% 94% 
Average 11% 89% 41% 59% 33% 67% 12% 88% 
 
Table D.2 
Professional Graduate in Other Employment - Summary of Degree Subject by Age 
and Degree Classification (Female Sample) 
 
Law Medicine/Dentistry Accountancy Psychology 
1st 2.1 1st 2.1 1st 2.1 1st 2.1 
25 to 35 10% 90% 33% 67% 29% 71% 13% 87% 
36 to 45 8% 92% 0% 100% 9% 91% 20% 80% 
46 to 60 6% 94% 27% 73% 23% 77% 16% 84% 
Average 8% 92% 20% 80% 20% 80% 16% 84% 
 
Table D.3 
Professional Graduate in Professional Employment - Summary of Degree Subject by 
Age and Degree Classification (Male Sample) 
 
Law Medicine/Dentistry Accountancy Psychology 
1st 2.1 1st 2.1 1st 2.1 1st 2.1 
25 to 35 15% 85% 46% 54% 13% 88% 100% 0% 
36 to 45 5% 95% 56% 44% 16% 84% 18% 82% 
46 to 60 17% 83% 35% 65% 10% 90% 57% 43% 
Average 12% 88% 45% 55% 13% 87% 58% 42% 
 
Table D.4 
Professional Graduate in Other Employment - Summary of Degree Subject by Age 
and Degree Classification (Male Sample) 
 
Law Medicine/Dentistry Accountancy Psychology 
1st 2.1 1st 2.1 1st 2.1 1st 2.1 
25 to 35 12% 88% 100% 0% 23% 77% 13% 87% 
36 to 45 9% 91% 67% 33% 17% 83% 18% 82% 
46 to 60 27% 73% 25% 75% 14% 86% 27% 73% 
Average 16% 84% 64% 36% 18% 82% 19% 81% 
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Table E.1 
Female Employment Premia ± Probit Model 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Probit 25-35 36-45 46-60 
Degree Variables 
Medicine and Dentistry 0.373*** 
(0.0456) 
0.338*** 
(0.0771) 
0.673*** 
(0.102) 
0.191** 
(0.0708) 
Law -0.0118 
(0.0338) 
0.0764 
(0.0534) 
0.000402 
(0.0593) 
-0.215** 
(0.0670) 
Psychology -0.135*** 
(0.0352) 
-0.282*** 
(0.0492) 
-0.116 
(0.0659) 
0.185* 
(0.0795) 
Accountancy -0.0297 
(0.0592) 
-0.104 
(0.0817) 
-0.104 
(0.0969) 
0.563** 
(0.212) 
Other Variables 
Age 0.0260*** 
(0.00417) 
0.489*** 
(0.0535) 
-0.268** 
(0.0907) 
0.596*** 
(0.0514) 
Age2 -0.000522*** 
(0.0000492) 
-0.00847*** 
(0.000889) 
0.00334** 
(0.00112) 
-0.00621*** 
(0.000486) 
London -0.175*** 
(0.0185) 
-0.156*** 
(0.0333) 
-0.293*** 
(0.0328) 
-0.0835** 
(0.0311) 
Rest of the UK -0.0623*** 
(0.0180) 
-0.104** 
(0.0324) 
-0.0391 
(0.0323) 
-0.0522 
(0.0300) 
2007 -0.132*** 
(0.0203) 
-0.110** 
(0.0349) 
-0.184*** 
(0.0360) 
-0.138*** 
(0.0357) 
2008 -0.130*** 
(0.0197) 
-0.149*** 
(0.0340) 
-0.182*** 
(0.0345) 
-0.0731* 
(0.0349) 
2009 -0.121*** 
(0.0196) 
-0.114*** 
(0.0343) 
-0.139*** 
(0.0348) 
-0.133*** 
(0.0338) 
2010 -0.139*** 
(0.0194) 
-0.196*** 
(0.0335) 
-0.151*** 
(0.0346) 
-0.0920** 
(0.0336) 
2011 -0.146*** 
(0.0197) 
-0.0982** 
(0.0353) 
-0.214*** 
(0.0348) 
-0.153*** 
(0.0333) 
2012 -0.0992*** 
(0.0193) 
-0.130*** 
(0.0340) 
-0.0923** 
(0.0344) 
-0.0982** 
(0.0327) 
2013 -0.0876*** 
(0.0194) 
-0.0483 
(0.0347) 
-0.102** 
(0.0341) 
-0.121*** 
(0.0327) 
2014 -0.0371 
(0.0195) 
-0.0608 
(0.0345) 
0.00778 
(0.0347) 
-0.0607 
(0.0327) 
Constant 1.189*** 
(0.0869) 
-5.405*** 
(0.800) 
6.680*** 
(1.826) 
-12.87*** 
(1.356) 
Diagnostics 
N 122651 48534 37603 36514 
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Table E.2 
Male Employment Premia ± Probit Model 
Standard errors in parentheses * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Probit 25-35 36-45 46-60 
Degree Variables 
Medicine and Dentistry 0.297*** 
(0.0573) 
0.286* 
(0.127) 
0.401** 
(0.141) 
0.270*** 
(0.0734) 
Law 0.0221 
(0.0490) 
-0.121 
(0.0758) 
0.165 
(0.117) 
0.0949 
(0.0775) 
Psychology -0.177* 
(0.0737) 
-0.261* 
(0.117) 
-0.306* 
(0.126) 
0.105 
(0.141) 
Accountancy 0.447*** 
(0.0918) 
0.438** 
(0.141) 
0.542* 
(0.218) 
0.400** 
(0.147) 
Other Variables 
Age 0.222*** 
(0.00508) 
0.562*** 
(0.0730) 
0.179 
(0.141) 
0.802*** 
(0.0552) 
Age2 -0.00285*** 
(0.0000591) 
-0.00847*** 
(0.00122) 
-0.00227 
(0.00174) 
-0.00831*** 
(0.000517) 
London 0.0455 
(0.0247) 
0.0660 
(0.0445) 
-0.0519 
(0.0553) 
0.0822* 
(0.0354) 
Rest of the UK -0.00543 
(0.0240) 
0.0557 
(0.0435) 
-0.0465 
(0.0544) 
-0.0244 
(0.0341) 
2007 -0.0710** 
(0.0268) 
0.00366 
(0.0494) 
-0.0863 
(0.0616) 
-0.113** 
(0.0380) 
2008 -0.0605* 
(0.0262) 
0.0157 
(0.0483) 
-0.214*** 
(0.0573) 
-0.0390 
(0.0376) 
2009 -0.168*** 
(0.0254) 
-0.101* 
(0.0468) 
-0.325*** 
(0.0555) 
-0.137*** 
(0.0366) 
2010 -0.146*** 
(0.0255) 
-0.120** 
(0.0465) 
-0.306*** 
(0.0555) 
-0.0914* 
(0.0367) 
2011 -0.164*** 
(0.0259) 
-0.221*** 
(0.0463) 
-0.232*** 
(0.0578) 
-0.0987** 
(0.0374) 
2012 -0.0982*** 
(0.0256) 
-0.106* 
(0.0467) 
-0.199*** 
(0.0569) 
-0.0516 
(0.0366) 
2013 -0.0584* 
(0.0259) 
-0.0650 
(0.0473) 
-0.205*** 
(0.0570) 
0.0117 
(0.0372) 
2014 -0.00853 
(0.0262) 
-0.00269 
(0.0478) 
-0.0626 
(0.0598) 
0.00801 
(0.0370) 
Constant -2.409*** 
(0.107) 
-7.511*** 
(1.081) 
-1.520 
(2.844) 
-17.68*** 
(1.466) 
Diagnostics 
N 108406 36407 32470 39529 
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Table F.1 
Female Wage Regressions 
Standard Errors in Parentheses * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS 25-35 36-45 46-60 
Degree/Employment Setting Variables 
Medic/Dentistry Degree ± 
Medic/Dentist Job 
0.531*** 
(0.0261) 
0.392*** 
(0.0311) 
0.596*** 
(0.0515) 
0.756*** 
(0.0651) 
Medic/Dentistry Degree ± 
Other Job 
0.0935 
(0.0607) 
0.0871 
(0.0827) 
0.0384 
(0.131) 
0.155 
(0.111) 
Law Degree ± Law Job 0.332*** 
(0.0291) 
0.284*** 
(0.0327) 
0.407*** 
(0.0582) 
0.380*** 
(0.0838) 
Law Degree ± Other Job 0.0395 
(0.0263) 
0.00708 
(0.0303) 
0.118* 
(0.0494) 
0.0155 
(0.0787) 
Psychology Degree ± 
Psychology Job 
0.251*** 
(0.0440) 
0.133** 
(0.0508) 
0.265** 
(0.0926) 
0.509*** 
(0.108) 
Psychology Degree ± Other 
Job 
0.0289 
(0.0223) 
0.0280 
(0.0260) 
-0.00743 
(0.0453) 
0.0778 
(0.0554) 
Accountancy Degree ± 
Accountancy Job 
0.317*** 
(0.0546) 
0.362*** 
(0.0595) 
0.274** 
(0.105) 
0.192 
(0.205) 
Accountancy Degree ± Other 
Job 
0.0996* 
(0.0415) 
0.119* 
(0.0493) 
0.0768 
(0.0735) 
0.0761 
(0.127) 
Other Variables 
Age 0.0746*** 
(0.00252) 
0.198*** 
(0.0242) 
0.144** 
(0.0553) 
0.0879* 
(0.0365) 
Age2 -0.000812*** 
(0.0000303) 
-0.00270*** 
(0.000401) 
-0.00174* 
(0.000685) 
-0.000882* 
(0.000348) 
London 0.135*** 
(0.00999) 
0.166*** 
(0.0139) 
0.187*** 
(0.0188) 
0.0420* 
(0.0201) 
Rest of the UK -0.0372*** 
(0.00954) 
-0.0235 
(0.0133) 
-0.00530 
(0.0178) 
-0.0820*** 
(0.0191) 
Public Sector -0.0254*** 
(0.00544) 
0.0125 
(0.00711) 
-0.0966*** 
(0.0102) 
0.00404 
(0.0119) 
Tenure Less Than 1 Year -0.222*** 
(0.00850) 
-0.150*** 
(0.0106) 
-0.271*** 
(0.0166) 
-0.238*** 
(0.0211) 
Tenure 1 to 5 Years -0.134*** 
(0.00614) 
-0.0712*** 
(0.00823) 
-0.181*** 
(0.0115) 
-0.137*** 
(0.0138) 
2007 -0.0675*** 
(0.0112) 
-0.0449** 
(0.0145) 
-0.0620** 
(0.0218) 
-0.107*** 
(0.0240) 
2008 -0.0314** 
(0.0108) 
0.0108 
(0.0144) 
-0.0589** 
(0.0208) 
-0.0668** 
(0.0228) 
2009 -0.0304** 
(0.0109) 
-0.00189 
(0.0145) 
-0.0509* 
(0.0207) 
-0.0400 
(0.0231) 
2010 -0.0426*** 
(0.0108) 
-0.00179 
(0.0144) 
-0.0614** 
(0.0206) 
-0.0758*** 
(0.0224) 
2011 -0.00765 
(0.0110) 
0.0104 
(0.0148) 
-0.00559 
(0.0208) 
-0.0345 
(0.0226) 
2012 -0.0137 
(0.0107) 
-0.00580 
(0.0145) 
-0.0242 
(0.0205) 
-0.0145 
(0.0219) 
2013 -0.0112 
(0.0110) 
0.00415 
(0.0150) 
-0.0286 
(0.0208) 
-0.0124 
(0.0226) 
2014 -0.00987 
(0.0106) 
0.00905 
(0.0144) 
-0.0194 
(0.0199) 
-0.0267 
(0.0218) 
Constant 1.264*** 
(0.0522) 
-0.816* 
(0.362) 
0.00216 
(1.112) 
0.806 
(0.953) 
Diagnostics 
R2 16.14% 19.66% 12.14% 7.16% 
N 24852 10272 7598 6982 
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Table F.2 
Male Wage Regressions 
Standard Errors in Parentheses * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS 25-35 36-45 46-60 
Degree/Employment Setting Variables 
Medic/Dentistry Degree ± 
Medic/Dentist Job 
0.519*** 
(0.0346) 
0.345*** 
(0.0524) 
0.589*** 
(0.0596) 
0.618*** 
(0.0673) 
Medic/Dentistry Degree ± 
Other Job 
0.475*** 
(0.0757) 
0.321 
(0.193) 
0.569*** 
(0.135) 
0.467*** 
(0.111) 
Law Degree ± Law Job 0.312*** 
(0.0388) 
0.297*** 
(0.0471) 
0.345*** 
(0.0721) 
0.318** 
(0.101) 
Law Degree ± Other Job 0.0969** 
(0.0359) 
0.0899 
(0.0471) 
0.105 
(0.0794) 
0.119 
(0.0671) 
Psychology Degree ± 
Psychology Job 
0.221* 
(0.101) 
0.165 
(0.387) 
0.00849 
(0.135) 
0.593** 
(0.182) 
Psychology Degree ± Other 
Job 
0.107* 
(0.0430) 
0.00650 
(0.0567) 
0.258** 
(0.0784) 
0.105 
(0.0946) 
Accountancy Degree ± 
Accountancy Job 
0.213*** 
(0.0532) 
0.252*** 
(0.0614) 
0.214* 
(0.103) 
0.115 
(0.152) 
Accountancy Degree ± Other 
Job 
0.217*** 
(0.0402) 
0.333*** 
(0.0538) 
0.0857 
(0.0703) 
0.217* 
(0.0913) 
Other Variables 
Age 0.116*** 
(0.00286) 
0.185*** 
(0.0307) 
0.132* 
(0.0598) 
0.0973** 
(0.0373) 
Age2 -0.00121*** 
(0.0000338) 
-0.00221*** 
(0.000508) 
-0.00141 
(0.000739) 
-0.000980** 
(0.000354) 
London 0.162*** 
(0.0125) 
0.183*** 
(0.0192) 
0.175*** 
(0.0230) 
0.125*** 
(0.0228) 
Rest of the UK -0.0382** 
(0.0122) 
-0.0334 
(0.0188) 
-0.0429 
(0.0225) 
-0.0375 
(0.0221) 
Public Sector -0.141*** 
(0.00654) 
-0.0955*** 
(0.00999) 
-0.185*** 
(0.0120) 
-0.146*** 
(0.0119) 
Tenure Less Than 1 Year -0.111*** 
(0.0101) 
-0.0992*** 
(0.0138) 
-0.124*** 
(0.0192) 
-0.0982*** 
(0.0218) 
Tenure 1 to 5 Years -0.0539*** 
(0.00706) 
-0.0429*** 
(0.0104) 
-0.0274* 
(0.0123) 
-0.0903*** 
(0.0145) 
2007 -0.0976*** 
(0.0128) 
-0.0440* 
(0.0189) 
-0.130*** 
(0.0232) 
-0.120*** 
(0.0245) 
2008 -0.0525*** 
(0.0124) 
0.00329 
(0.0184) 
-0.0795*** 
(0.0223) 
-0.0811*** 
(0.0236) 
2009 -0.0487*** 
(0.0125) 
-0.0220 
(0.0186) 
-0.0794*** 
(0.0226) 
-0.0448 
(0.0237) 
2010 -0.0314* 
(0.0125) 
-0.0183 
(0.0187) 
-0.0477* 
(0.0225) 
-0.0217 
(0.0236) 
2011 -0.0262* 
(0.0127) 
-0.0236 
(0.0190) 
-0.0441 
(0.0227) 
-0.00542 
(0.0240) 
2012 -0.0353** 
(0.0125) 
-0.00197 
(0.0189) 
-0.0447* 
(0.0223) 
-0.0557* 
(0.0234) 
2013 -0.0231 
(0.0128) 
0.00359 
(0.0191) 
-0.0473* 
(0.0230) 
-0.0263 
(0.0240) 
2014 -0.0154 
(0.0124) 
0.00347 
(0.0186) 
-0.0391 
(0.0224) 
-0.0129 
(0.0229) 
Constant 0.442*** 
(0.0606) 
-0.760 
(0.462) 
0.168 
(1.206) 
0.828 
(0.978) 
Diagnostics 
R2 22.51% 24.09% 12.32% 7.46% 
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N 21801 7572 6928 7301 
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Table G.1 
Female Median Wage Regressions 
Standard Errors in Parentheses * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS 25-35 36-45 46-60 
Degree/Employment Setting Variables 
Medic/Dentistry Degree ± 
Medic/Dentist Job 
0.522*** 
(0.0268) 
0.338*** 
(0.0335) 
0.614*** 
(0.0514) 
0.704*** 
(0.0592) 
Medic/Dentist Degree ± 
Other Job 
0.0270 
(0.0617) 
-0.0184 
(0.0867) 
0.0617 
(0.125) 
0.0541 
(0.0990) 
Law Degree ± Law Job 0.308*** 
(0.0298) 
0.291*** 
(0.0348) 
0.451*** 
(0.0581) 
0.242** 
(0.0757) 
Law Degree ± Other Job 0.00473 
(0.0270) 
-0.0179 
(0.0325) 
0.116* 
(0.0493) 
0.0694 
(0.0712) 
Psychology Degree ± 
Psychology Job 
0.210*** 
(0.0449) 
0.0889 
(0.0542) 
0.289** 
(0.0910) 
0.577*** 
(0.0965) 
Psychology Degree ± Other 
Job 
-0.00168 
(0.0228) 
0.00523 
(0.0280) 
-0.0706 
(0.0453) 
0.0287 
(0.0505) 
Accountancy Degree ± 
Accountancy Job 
0.368*** 
(0.0556) 
0.356*** 
(0.0632) 
0.356*** 
(0.103) 
0.0926 
(0.168) 
Accountancy Degree ± Other 
Job 
0.226*** 
(0.0424) 
0.194*** 
(0.0526) 
0.219** 
(0.0729) 
0.00917 
(0.112) 
Other Variables 
Age 0.0786*** 
(0.00259) 
0.176*** 
(0.0260) 
0.183*** 
(0.0556) 
0.102** 
(0.0335) 
Age2 -0.000852*** 
(0.0000312) 
-0.00230*** 
(0.000432) 
-0.00221** 
(0.000688) 
-0.00100** 
(0.000319) 
London 0.117*** 
(0.0103) 
0.135*** 
(0.0150) 
0.155*** 
(0.0188) 
0.0361* 
(0.0184) 
Rest of the UK -0.0272** 
(0.00980) 
-0.0262 
(0.0144) 
-0.00448 
(0.0179) 
-0.0422* 
(0.0175) 
Public 0.00327 
(0.00559) 
0.0331*** 
(0.00766) 
-0.0697*** 
(0.0103) 
0.0398*** 
(0.0109) 
Tenure Less Than 1 Year -0.207*** 
(0.00873) 
-0.140*** 
(0.0114) 
-0.264*** 
(0.0167) 
-0.228*** 
(0.0193) 
Tenure 1 to 5 Years -0.118*** 
(0.00631) 
-0.0667*** 
(0.00886) 
-0.155*** 
(0.0115) 
-0.137*** 
(0.0126) 
2007 -0.0787*** 
(0.0115) 
-0.0536*** 
(0.0156) 
-0.0797*** 
(0.0219) 
-0.0999*** 
(0.0220) 
2008 -0.0465*** 
(0.0111) 
-0.00841 
(0.0155) 
-0.0711*** 
(0.0209) 
-0.0784*** 
(0.0209) 
2009 -0.0421*** 
(0.0112) 
-0.0247 
(0.0156) 
-0.0749*** 
(0.0208) 
-0.0508* 
(0.0211) 
2010 -0.0317** 
(0.0111) 
-0.00841 
(0.0155) 
-0.0565** 
(0.0207) 
-0.0582** 
(0.0205) 
2011 -0.0000751 
(0.0113) 
0.00723 
(0.0159) 
-0.0217 
(0.0209) 
-0.00900 
(0.0207) 
2012 -0.0176 
(0.0110) 
-0.0180 
(0.0157) 
-0.00252 
(0.0206) 
-0.0182 
(0.0201) 
2013 -0.000708 
(0.0114) 
0.00100 
(0.0162) 
-0.0137 
(0.0209) 
-0.00694 
(0.0207) 
2014 -0.00883 
(0.0109) 
-0.00624 
(0.0155) 
-0.00959 
(0.0200) 
-0.0205 
(0.0200) 
Constant 1.168*** 
(0.0536) 
-0.488 
(0.390) 
-0.795 
(1.117) 
0.358 
(0.874) 
Diagnostics 
R2 10.22% 12.00% 6.19% 3.47% 
N 24852 10272 7598 6982 
42 
 
 
Table G.2 
Male Median Wage Regressions 
Standard Errors in Parentheses * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS 25-35 36-45 46-60 
Degree/Employment Setting Variables 
Medic/Dentistry Degree ± 
Medic/Dentistry Job 
0.528*** 
(0.0371) 
0.339*** 
(0.0623) 
0.602*** 
(0.0672) 
0.666*** 
(0.0653) 
Medic/Dentistry Degree ± 
Other Job 
0.575*** 
(0.0803) 
0.390 
(0.201) 
0.627*** 
(0.147) 
0.605*** 
(0.107) 
Law Degree ± Law Job 0.312*** 
(0.0416) 
0.297*** 
(0.0562) 
0.427*** 
(0.0809) 
0.198* 
(0.0972) 
Law Degree ± Other Job 0.119** 
(0.0385) 
0.0885 
(0.0561) 
0.104 
(0.0875) 
0.178** 
(0.0656) 
Psychology Degree ± 
Psychology Job 
0.307** 
(0.106) 
0.153*** 
(0.0239) 
0.0461 
(0.147) 
0.627*** 
(0.167) 
Psychology Degree ± Other 
Job 
0.0558 
(0.0460) 
0.0214 
(0.0673) 
0.336*** 
(0.0877) 
0.0729 
(0.0917) 
Accountancy Degree ± 
Accountancy Job 
0.217*** 
(0.0568) 
0.283*** 
(0.0728) 
0.140 
(0.114) 
0.104 
(0.143) 
Accountancy Degree ± Other 
Job 
0.230*** 
(0.0431) 
0.333*** 
(0.0640) 
0.100 
(0.0779) 
0.232** 
(0.0887) 
Other Variables 
Age 0.112*** 
(0.00307) 
0.159*** 
(0.0368) 
0.175** 
(0.0679) 
0.119** 
(0.0368) 
Age2 -0.00115*** 
(0.0000363) 
-0.00177** 
(0.000609) 
-0.00194* 
(0.000838) 
-0.00116*** 
(0.000350) 
London 0.152*** 
(0.0135) 
0.153*** 
(0.0230) 
0.183*** 
(0.0261) 
0.116*** 
(0.0224) 
Rest of the UK -0.0259* 
(0.0132) 
-0.0339 
(0.0225) 
-0.0234 
(0.0255) 
-0.0104 
(0.0217) 
Public -0.130*** 
(0.00704) 
-0.0857*** 
(0.0120) 
-0.172*** 
(0.0136) 
-0.155*** 
(0.0117) 
Tenure Less Than 1 Year -0.0993*** 
(0.0109) 
-0.0833*** 
(0.0165) 
-0.0896*** 
(0.0218) 
-0.119*** 
(0.0216) 
Tenure 1 to 5 Years -0.0476*** 
(0.00759) 
-0.0343** 
(0.0125) 
-0.0117 
(0.0139) 
-0.0922*** 
(0.0143) 
2007 -0.101*** 
(0.0138) 
-0.0639** 
(0.0227) 
-0.140*** 
(0.0263) 
-0.128*** 
(0.0241) 
2008 -0.0699*** 
(0.0134) 
-0.0236 
(0.0221) 
-0.0853*** 
(0.0254) 
-0.121*** 
(0.0233) 
2009 -0.0603*** 
(0.0135) 
-0.0380 
(0.0222) 
-0.0917*** 
(0.0257) 
-0.0597* 
(0.0234) 
2010 -0.0367** 
(0.0134) 
-0.0189 
(0.0224) 
-0.0464 
(0.0255) 
-0.0519* 
(0.0233) 
2011 -0.0334* 
(0.0136) 
-0.0328 
(0.0228) 
-0.0518* 
(0.0257) 
-0.0125 
(0.0237) 
2012 -0.0423** 
(0.0134) 
-0.0355 
(0.0226) 
-0.0565* 
(0.0253) 
-0.0454* 
(0.0230) 
2013 -0.0227 
(0.0137) 
-0.0197 
(0.0229) 
-0.0492 
(0.0261) 
-0.0384 
(0.0237) 
2014 -0.0307* 
(0.0133) 
-0.0167 
(0.0223) 
-0.0698** 
(0.0255) 
-0.0358 
(0.0226) 
Constant 0.520*** 
(0.0651) 
-0.350 
(0.554) 
-0.737 
(1.369) 
0.202 
(0.965) 
Diagnostics 
R2 13.98% 14.22% 7.2% 4.27% 
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N 21801 7572 6928 7301 
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